Judith Butler spends the first chapter of Gender Trouble discussing the representation of
women in an activist setting. She explains that systems of power produce what they claim to
represent; political systems produce political subjects. This means that systems of power -
typically political systems - represent people (subjects) according to a set of standards, rules, or
regulations that those systems put in place. This is what makes these people or “subjects”
political subjects - they become subjects of that specific system. For instance, the term
“women” is the subject of the term “feminism.” Consequently, the term “feminism” becomes a
subject for the political system “patriarchy.” This is why in most political contexts, the subject
becomes prone to the system’s regulations, prohibitions and limitations. Butler argues that the
way we personally refer to “subjects” changes our views and applications of them in various
cultural and discursive frameworks.
Judith quotes Catharine MacKinnon in her text: “Gender emerges as the congealed form
of the sexualization of inequality between men and women” (13). Moreover, this gender
discrimination or inequality strongly relies on the classification of the masculine binary as
opposed to the feminine binary. She explains that it is impossible to limit identity to a single
masculine or feminine binary, as there are constantly other outward factors at play. One is not
born with an unchangeable identity that they carry with them their entire lives. Similarly, Butler
communicates that one is born a specific sex, and then gender develops regardless of this sex.
Most times, anything “feminine” is overshadowed by anything “masculine.” The feminine
“gender” is sometimes even defined in terms of the “superior” masculine “gender.” Woman
exists to be an inferior counterpart, “Other”— a being that carries no meaning unless it is given
to her by her male superior. However, Butler refutes this, of course. She refuses ideas that are
set in stone by a closed phallogocentric signifying community, and chooses to believe in
unmarked, free gender. She refers to Irigaray, “Women are the ‘sex’ which is not ‘one’” (Butler
14). She writes, “Women are unrepresentable. In other words, women represent the sex that
cannot be thought, a linguistic absence and opacity” (Butler 14). It is simply impossible to
properly represent the complexity that women bear.
The reason I focused on this excerpt in specific, though, is because I find Butler’s word
choice of “linguistic absence” especially interesting. In “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,”
Butler pays specific attention to linguistic choices in Aretha Franklin’s “(You Make Me Feel Like)
A Natural Woman.” She offers alternate interpretations for the song, and considers looking at
it—or rather listening to it—through a lens outside the typical matrix. When Aretha Franklin
sings “you make me feel like a natural woman,” she suggests that her position as a culturally
constructed “woman” is actualized due to its recognition in the romantic and sexual scenes.
However, Butler points out that although Aretha Franklin appears to be glad and relieved at
having her naturalness confirmed, this confirmation is actually never guaranteed. Consider
omitting the parentheticals from the title of the song; can a “natural woman” be a “natural
woman” by herself, or is she only transformed into one once she is romantically
recognized—once a man makes her feel like a natural woman? Moreover, this feeling itself
presents a sense of imposture or illusion, hence allowing the appearance of alternate interpretations in Aretha’s song. Butler asks the questions “What if Aretha were singing to me?
Or what if she were singing to a drag queen whose performance somehow confirmed her
own?” Butler explores the possibilities that arise when gender is no longer confined within a
limited phallocentric medium. By suggesting that the song is sung to perhaps another woman,
or a cross-dressing man, Butler adds layers of linguistic complexity to the tune.
Of course, this linguistic complexity is not only applicable to Western artists, but it also
becomes applicable to Arab middle-eastern artists. Abdel Halim Hafez (along with most male
Arab singers) uses masculine pronouns in his song “انا لك على طول” to refer to his partner, who
was supposedly female. Any Arab would not really consider this odd since most musicians and
poets apply this to their work in order to properly use classical Arabic verse. But suppose
someone isn’t aware of this. Suppose that one is looking at this through Judith Butler’s lens of
gender. This suspends the listener in a world in which the artist could actually be singing to
another man, or he could have felt more comfortable as a “woman” singing to her partner who
is a man. Either way, once these interpretations are considered, there is a breach in the typical
heteronormative definition of gender, and this is what Butler attempts to prove to her readers.
Gender should not rely on a set of stable binaries that define individuals, their identities and
sexualities. It’s the exact opposite, as gender should rely on nothing but the indefinite
exploration of identity, whether it be feminine, masculine, or both.
Comments